CVE Tools

CVE-2026-89102

OCSP stapling v2 multi accepts non-CA chain certificates as issuers

No known exploitation. No EPSS score yet. No fix published yet.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

No fixed build or workaround is published yet. Limit exposure and watch for a patch.

What it is

From the CVE record

In wolfSSL versions 5.7.2 through 5.9.2 there is a client-side implementation flaw in RFC 6961, multiple OCSP response stapling, which can lead to certificate forgery. When a wolfSSL client enables OCSP stapling with the HAVE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_REQUEST_V2 feature and calls wolfSSL_UseOCSPStaplingV2(ssl, WOLFSSL_CSR2_OCSP_MULTI, options), the client accepts any certificate in the peer's chain as a certificate authority without verifying that the certificate is actually authorized to act as one. This means that an attacker who possesses any certificate that chains to a CA trusted by the client (along with its private key) can forge certificates for arbitrary identities that will be accepted as valid by the client. The end entity certificate of the server is stored in the persistent trust store, affecting subsequent connections that reuse the context even when OCSP multi usage is not employed. Found by internal wolfSSL testing.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

No EPSS score yet. New CVEs are usually scored within a few days.

Lifecycle

4 events over 0 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped, record updated

Affected products

Technical detail

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

Watch the software you run.

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We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for WolfSSL, not every advisory.

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