CVE-2026-54513
jackson-databind: Array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)
No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 68th percentile. A vendor fix is available.
What to do
The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.
What it is
From the CVE record
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
In plain language
No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.
- EPSS
1.2% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 68th percentile of scored CVEs.
Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.
Lifecycle
35 events over 83 days, from the signal feeds we watch.
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
Affected products
And 1 more affected product. See all after sign-in
Technical detail
CVSS 3.1 vector
Open in the CVSS calculatorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Scored 8.1 by NVD.
How it is reached
- Attack Vector NetworkExploitable remotely over the network without any special conditions
- Attack Complexity HighRequires specific conditions like a race condition or non-default configuration
- Privileges Required NoneNo authentication required — anyone can exploit this
- User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation
Scope
- Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself
Impact if exploited
- Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
- Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
- Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable
Weaknesses
Sources
References in the record
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5981
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5983
And 29 more references. See all after sign-in
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