CVE-2026-48501
GitHub CLI tokens leak via `gh attestation` commands
No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 36th percentile. A vendor fix is available.
What to do
The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.
What it is
From the CVE record
GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.93.0, GitHub CLI incorrectly includes authorization header in API requests to TUF repository mirrors via gh attestation, gh release verify, and gh release verify-asset commands. The CLI uses a shared HTTP client with an authentication layer that automatically attaches tokens to outgoing requests. This layer lacks accurate host detection and can incorrectly attribute the target host, providing it with a token it should never receive. Specifically, the host normalization logic collapses any *.github.com subdomain to github.com, so a request to tuf-repo.github.com (a GitHub Pages site, not a GitHub API endpoint) is treated as a request to github.com and receives the user's github.com token. For hosts that don't match github.com or a known GHES instance at all, the resolver falls back to GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN if set. The gh attestation, gh release verify and gh release verify-asset commands fetch data from several external hosts as part of their normal operation (TUF metadata from tuf-repo.github.com and tuf-repo-cdn.sigstore.dev, artifact bundles from Azure Blob Storage). Because these requests go through the same authenticated HTTP client, the token is sent to all of them. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.93.0.
In plain language
No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.
- EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 36th percentile of scored CVEs.
Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.
Lifecycle
9 events over 67 days, from the signal feeds we watch.
- OpenVAS check added
- Patch availableworkaround available, record updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped
Affected products
Technical detail
CVSS 3.1 vector
Open in the CVSS calculatorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Scored 7.4 by NVD.
How it is reached
- Attack Vector NetworkExploitable remotely over the network without any special conditions
- Attack Complexity HighRequires specific conditions like a race condition or non-default configuration
- Privileges Required NoneNo authentication required — anyone can exploit this
- User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation
Scope
- Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself
Impact if exploited
- Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
- Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
- Availability NoneNo availability impact
Weaknesses
ATT&CK techniques
Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.
Sources
References in the record
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