CVE Tools

CVE-2026-43503

net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 7th percentile. A vendor fix is available.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.

Steps

Written by AI from the record
  1. Check your Linux kernel version (for example with uname -r) and compare it to the fixed commits/branches listed by your distribution.
  2. Identify whether your setup includes the packet paths described in the issue: ESP input (esp4.c/esp6.c) and any nft “dup to ” (or other nf_dup_ipv4()/xt_TEE usage).
  3. If you are vulnerable, upgrade/patch your Linux kernel to include the fix; use one of the fixed revisions: fbeab9555564a1b98e8582cd106dfe46c4606991, 179f1852bdedc300e373e807cc102cd81feff196, 12401fcfb01f53ccc63ab0a3246570fe8f3105ee, 989214c66884d70716d83dc1d0bf5e16287bf349, fc6eb39c55e97df2f94ad974b8a5bbcd019da2c8, ff375cc75f9167168db38e0464a482d5fbc8d81d, 9bc9d6d6967a2239aa57af2aa53554eddd640d20, or 48f6a5356a33dd78e7144ae1faef95ffc990aae0 (or your vendor’s kernel package that contains these fixes).
  4. After upgrading, validate that your nft/ESP-related configurations still work, and re-check that you’re on a fixed kernel build.

What it is

From the CVE record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()->flags when moving frags from source to destination. __pskb_copy_fclone() defers the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs, type} and never touches skb_shinfo()->flags; skb_shift() moves frag descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched. As a result, the destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as false. The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c, esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to <local>' rule -- or any other nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via authencesn-ESN stray writes. Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors were actually moved from the source. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand() share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change. The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list(). The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole onto p's frag_list. Downstream skb_segment() reads only skb_shinfo(p)->flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker. The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue into a freshly allocated nskb. The helper falls into the same family and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently. The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the new frag_skb's flag into nskb. Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.

In plain language

Written by AI from the record

This is a Linux kernel flaw that can let a local user with network capabilities write into protected file page memory and potentially gain root; most small businesses aren’t affected unless you run Linux servers exposed to untrusted local users or tenants—this needs patching but it’s not an internet-only issue.

In the Linux kernel, certain skb fragment-copy/shift helpers fail to propagate the shared-frag marker, causing ESP input (esp4.c/esp6.c) and similar in-place writers to incorrectly believe pages aren’t shared; attackers can use a local packet duplication path (for example an nft “dup to <local>” rule / nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller) to reach a condition where unprivileged code can corrupt page-cache-backed memory and escalate privileges (CVE-2026-43503).

If you're affected

  • Local users may gain root
  • Potential kernel memory corruption
  • Full system takeover
  • Service disruption risk

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS7th
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.2% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 7th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

11 events over 93 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Patch availablerecord updated
  2. Patch availablerecord updated
  3. Patch availablerecord updated
  4. Patch availablerecord updated
  5. OpenVAS check added
  6. Publishedweakness classified

Affected products

And 1 more affected product. See all after sign-in

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Scored 8.8 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope ChangedThe exploit can affect other components (e.g. sandbox escape, host compromise from VM)

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
  • Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

Sources

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