CVE-2026-43503
net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers
No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 7th percentile. A vendor fix is available.
What to do
The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.
Steps
Written by AI from the record- Check your Linux kernel version (for example with
uname -r) and compare it to the fixed commits/branches listed by your distribution. - Identify whether your setup includes the packet paths described in the issue: ESP input (esp4.c/esp6.c) and any nft “dup to
” (or other nf_dup_ipv4()/xt_TEE usage). - If you are vulnerable, upgrade/patch your Linux kernel to include the fix; use one of the fixed revisions: fbeab9555564a1b98e8582cd106dfe46c4606991, 179f1852bdedc300e373e807cc102cd81feff196, 12401fcfb01f53ccc63ab0a3246570fe8f3105ee, 989214c66884d70716d83dc1d0bf5e16287bf349, fc6eb39c55e97df2f94ad974b8a5bbcd019da2c8, ff375cc75f9167168db38e0464a482d5fbc8d81d, 9bc9d6d6967a2239aa57af2aa53554eddd640d20, or 48f6a5356a33dd78e7144ae1faef95ffc990aae0 (or your vendor’s kernel package that contains these fixes).
- After upgrading, validate that your nft/ESP-related configurations still work, and re-check that you’re on a fixed kernel build.
What it is
From the CVE record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()->flags when moving frags from source to destination. __pskb_copy_fclone() defers the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs, type} and never touches skb_shinfo()->flags; skb_shift() moves frag descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched. As a result, the destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as false. The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c, esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to <local>' rule -- or any other nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via authencesn-ESN stray writes. Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors were actually moved from the source. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand() share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change. The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list(). The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole onto p's frag_list. Downstream skb_segment() reads only skb_shinfo(p)->flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker. The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue into a freshly allocated nskb. The helper falls into the same family and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently. The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the new frag_skb's flag into nskb. Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.
In plain language
Written by AI from the recordThis is a Linux kernel flaw that can let a local user with network capabilities write into protected file page memory and potentially gain root; most small businesses aren’t affected unless you run Linux servers exposed to untrusted local users or tenants—this needs patching but it’s not an internet-only issue.
In the Linux kernel, certain skb fragment-copy/shift helpers fail to propagate the shared-frag marker, causing ESP input (esp4.c/esp6.c) and similar in-place writers to incorrectly believe pages aren’t shared; attackers can use a local packet duplication path (for example an nft “dup to <local>” rule / nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller) to reach a condition where unprivileged code can corrupt page-cache-backed memory and escalate privileges (CVE-2026-43503).
If you're affected
- Local users may gain root
- Potential kernel memory corruption
- Full system takeover
- Service disruption risk
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.
- EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 7th percentile of scored CVEs.
Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.
Lifecycle
11 events over 93 days, from the signal feeds we watch.
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Patch availablerecord updated
- OpenVAS check added
- Publishedweakness classified
Affected products
And 1 more affected product. See all after sign-in
Technical detail
CVSS 3.1 vector
Open in the CVSS calculatorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Scored 8.8 by NVD.
How it is reached
- Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
- Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
- Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
- User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation
Scope
- Scope ChangedThe exploit can affect other components (e.g. sandbox escape, host compromise from VM)
Impact if exploited
- Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
- Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
- Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable
Weaknesses
Sources
References in the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbeab9555564a1b98e8582cd106dfe46c4606991
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/179f1852bdedc300e373e807cc102cd81feff196
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/12401fcfb01f53ccc63ab0a3246570fe8f3105ee
And 38 more references. See all after sign-in
In the news
- Hacker Runs Hermes AI Agent Unattended for Post-Exploitation at Thai Finance Ministry
- Security Week 2627: поддельные инструменты ИИ как приманка для малого бизнеса
- Linux-уязвимость DirtyClone помогает повысить права до уровня root
- ⚡ Weekly Recap: Linux Kernel Flaws, AI Malware Tricks, Turla Backdoor, Infostealers and More
- ‘DirtyClone’ Linux Kernel Vulnerability Leads to Root Access
- New DirtyClone Linux Kernel Flaw Lets Local Users Gain Root via Cloned Packets
Watch the software you run.
My Stack ranks new CVEs for your products by real-world exploitation, so the next serious one reaches you without reading every advisory.
We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for Linux, not every advisory.
A free account adds
- The full version matrix and every affected product
- Exploit links, proofs of concept and Metasploit modules
- Email alerts for the products you watch
- The same data over REST API, MCP and CLI