CVE Tools

CVE-2024-41010

bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry

Public exploit available. Not confirmed exploited in the wild yet. A vendor fix is available.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD, BDU

What to do

The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.

What it is

From the CVE record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry Pedro Pinto and later independently also Hyunwoo Kim and Wongi Lee reported an issue that the tcx_entry can be released too early leading to a use after free (UAF) when an active old-style ingress or clsact qdisc with a shared tc block is later replaced by another ingress or clsact instance. Essentially, the sequence to trigger the UAF (one example) can be as follows: 1. A network namespace is created 2. An ingress qdisc is created. This allocates a tcx_entry, and &tcx_entry->miniq is stored in the qdisc's miniqp->p_miniq. At the same time, a tcf block with index 1 is created. 3. chain0 is attached to the tcf block. chain0 must be connected to the block linked to the ingress qdisc to later reach the function tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() which triggers the UAF. 4. Create and graft a clsact qdisc. This causes the ingress qdisc created in step 1 to be removed, thus freeing the previously linked tcx_entry: rtnetlink_rcv_msg() => tc_modify_qdisc() => qdisc_create() => clsact_init() [a] => qdisc_graft() => qdisc_destroy() => __qdisc_destroy() => ingress_destroy() [b] => tcx_entry_free() => kfree_rcu() // tcx_entry freed 5. Finally, the network namespace is closed. This registers the cleanup_net worker, and during the process of releasing the remaining clsact qdisc, it accesses the tcx_entry that was already freed in step 4, causing the UAF to occur: cleanup_net() => ops_exit_list() => default_device_exit_batch() => unregister_netdevice_many() => unregister_netdevice_many_notify() => dev_shutdown() => qdisc_put() => clsact_destroy() [c] => tcf_block_put_ext() => tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() => tcf_chain_head_change_item() => clsact_chain_head_change() => mini_qdisc_pair_swap() // UAF There are also other variants, the gist is to add an ingress (or clsact) qdisc with a specific shared block, then to replace that qdisc, waiting for the tcx_entry kfree_rcu() to be executed and subsequently accessing the current active qdisc's miniq one way or another. The correct fix is to turn the miniq_active boolean into a counter. What can be observed, at step 2 above, the counter transitions from 0->1, at step [a] from 1->2 (in order for the miniq object to remain active during the replacement), then in [b] from 2->1 and finally [c] 1->0 with the eventual release. The reference counter in general ranges from [0,2] and it does not need to be atomic since all access to the counter is protected by the rtnl mutex. With this in place, there is no longer a UAF happening and the tcx_entry is freed at the correct time.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS28th
Public exploit
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

1 source with a proof of concept or module.

Exploit links, PoCs and Metasploit modules after sign-in
EPSS

0.4% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 28th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

The patch came 471 days before any public exploit.

  1. Patch availablerecord updated
  2. OpenVAS check added
  3. Public exploit / PoCsource: github-poc
  4. Patch availablerecord updated
  5. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped

Affected products

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Scored 7.8 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
  • Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

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