CVE-2020-27403
Public exploit available. Not confirmed exploited in the wild yet. A vendor fix is available.
What to do
The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.
What it is
From the CVE record
A vulnerability in the TCL Android Smart TV series V8-R851T02-LF1 V295 and below and V8-T658T01-LF1 V373 and below by TCL Technology Group Corporation allows an attacker on the adjacent network to arbitrarily browse and download sensitive files over an insecure web server running on port 7989 that lists all files & directories. An unprivileged remote attacker on the adjacent network, can download most system files, leading to serious critical information disclosure. Also, some TV models and/or FW versions may expose the webserver with the entire filesystem accessible on another port. For example, nmap scan for all ports run directly from the TV model U43P6046 (Android 8.0) showed port 7983 not mentioned in the original CVE description, but containing the same directory listing of the entire filesystem. This webserver is bound (at least) to localhost interface and accessible freely to all unprivileged installed apps on the Android such as a regular web browser. Any app can therefore read any files of any other apps including Android system settings including sensitive data such as saved passwords, private keys etc.
In plain language
No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
2 sources with a proof of concept or module.
Exploit links, PoCs and Metasploit modules after sign-in- EPSS
2.7% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 85th percentile of scored CVEs.
Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.
Lifecycle
The patch came 471 days before any public exploit.
- Public exploit / PoCsource: github-poc
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped
Affected products
- 32s330 firmwareNetworking Infrastructure / router-switch
- 40s330 firmwareNetworking Infrastructure / router-switch
- 43s434 firmwareNetworking Infrastructure / router-switch
- 50s434 firmwareNetworking Infrastructure / router-switch
- 55s434 firmwareHardware Firmware
- 65s434 firmwareHardware Firmware
- 75s434 firmwareHardware Firmware
And 1 more affected product. See all after sign-in
Technical detail
CVSS 3.1 vector
Open in the CVSS calculatorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Scored 6.5 by NVD.
How it is reached
- Attack Vector AdjacentRequires access to the local network (e.g. same Wi-Fi, Bluetooth)
- Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
- Privileges Required NoneNo authentication required — anyone can exploit this
- User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation
Scope
- Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself
Impact if exploited
- Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
- Integrity NoneNo integrity impact
- Availability NoneNo availability impact
Weaknesses
ATT&CK techniques
Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.
Sources
References in the record
- github.com/sickcodes
- github.com/sickcodes/security/blob/master/advisories/SICK-2020-009.md
- sick.codes/sick-2020-009
And 7 more references. See all after sign-in
Watch the software you run.
My Stack ranks new CVEs for your products by real-world exploitation, so the next serious one reaches you without reading every advisory.
We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for 32s330 Firmware, not every advisory. This one: public exploit.
A free account adds
- The full version matrix and every affected product
- Exploit links, proofs of concept and Metasploit modules
- Email alerts for the products you watch
- The same data over REST API, MCP and CLI