CVE Tools

CVE-2018-8897

Public exploit available. Not confirmed exploited in the wild yet. A vendor fix is available.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD, BDU

What to do

The vendor has published a fix. Version details are below where the sources state them.

What it is

From the CVE record

A statement in the System Programming Guide of the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual (SDM) was mishandled in the development of some or all operating-system kernels, resulting in unexpected behavior for #DB exceptions that are deferred by MOV SS or POP SS, as demonstrated by (for example) privilege escalation in Windows, macOS, some Xen configurations, or FreeBSD, or a Linux kernel crash. The MOV to SS and POP SS instructions inhibit interrupts (including NMIs), data breakpoints, and single step trap exceptions until the instruction boundary following the next instruction (SDM Vol. 3A; section 6.8.3). (The inhibited data breakpoints are those on memory accessed by the MOV to SS or POP to SS instruction itself.) Note that debug exceptions are not inhibited by the interrupt enable (EFLAGS.IF) system flag (SDM Vol. 3A; section 2.3). If the instruction following the MOV to SS or POP to SS instruction is an instruction like SYSCALL, SYSENTER, INT 3, etc. that transfers control to the operating system at CPL < 3, the debug exception is delivered after the transfer to CPL < 3 is complete. OS kernels may not expect this order of events and may therefore experience unexpected behavior when it occurs.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS97th
Public exploit
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

4 sources with a proof of concept or module.

Exploit links, PoCs and Metasploit modules after sign-in
EPSS

18% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 97th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

The patch came 471 days before any public exploit.

  1. OpenVAS check added
  2. Public exploit / PoCsource: exploit-db
  3. Patch availablerecord updated
  4. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped

Affected products

And 23 more affected products. See all after sign-in

Technical detail

CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Scored 7.8 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
  • Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

Watch the software you run.

My Stack ranks new CVEs for your products by real-world exploitation, so the next serious one reaches you without reading every advisory.

We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for Windows 7 Service Pack 1, not every advisory. This one: public exploit.

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